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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this matter is properly before this Court pursuant to Article VIE, Section 3 
of the Constitution of Utah and Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The question presented on appeal is whether the lower court was correct in granting 
Defendant's request to stay the breach of contract action, but denying Defendant's request to stay 
the bad faith action and then ordering that it respond to discovery that may be relevant in the bad 
faith action. This question involves the determination of the following issues: 
1. Is a showing of "legal entitlement" a prerequisite to maintaining a claim for 
underinsured motorist (UM) benefits? 
2. Should Plaintiffs' claim for bad faith be stayed pending Plaintiffs showing breach 
of contract? 
3. Should proceedings in an action for bad faith be stayed pending a showing by 
Plaintiffs of "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits and breach of contract, thereby 
preventing discovery of matters relating only to the bad faith action? 
4. Does a showing of "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits establish that the insurance 
company has breached its insurance contract or the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing with Plaintiffs? 
The lower court's legal conclusions staying the breach of contract claim, allowing the bad 
faith claim to proceed without first showing "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits and then 
1 
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ordering discovery on the bad faith claim is reviewed for correctness. Lieber v. ITTHartford 
Ins. Ctr., Inc., 15 P.3d 1030 (Ut. 2000); Miller v. USAA Casualty Ins., 44 P.3d 663, 670 (Ut. 
2002). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT 
The issues presented on appeal were preserved by Defendant's Motion to Compel 
Arbitration and Request to Stay Breach of Contract, Bad Faith and Associated Causes; 
Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and Request for a Protective Order 
Pursuant to Rule 26(c) (R. 117-127); and Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration (R. 177-178, 
180-199). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arises out of Plaintiffs' claim for underinsured motorist benefits because of an 
automobile accident which occurred on May 10, 2001, resulting in alleged injuries to Plaintiffs. 
After receiving the policy limits from the tortfeasor's insurance carrier, Plaintiffs made a demand 
for the policy limits under the underinsured motorist provision of their insurance policy with 
Farmers Insurance Exchange ("Farmers"). While Farmers was investigating the claim, Plaintiffs 
filed suit alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (bad 
faith), and breach of fiduciary duty based on Farmers' failure to "diligently" investigate, evaluate, 
negotiate and reject or settle Plaintiffs' claim. (Plaintiffs' claim for breach of fiduciary duty was 
dismissed pursuant to Stipulation and Order on July 15, 2003). 
2 
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Because of a dispute as to the value of the claim, Farmers elected arbitration pursuant to 
the arbitration provision in its policy and U.C.A. §78-31a-4 and §31A-21-13. Plaintiffs initially 
objected to arbitration so Farmers filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiffs' 
underinsured motorist (UM) claim only and requested that the breach of contract, bad faith and 
associated causes of action be stayed. Defendant argued that the arbitration provision in its 
policy was valid and enforceable and that the arbitration of the Plaintiffs' UIM claim would 
establish whether Plaintiffs were "legally entitled" to benefits under the policy, a prerequisite to 
establishing whether there was a breach of the insurance contract, a prerequisite to filing a bad 
faith claim. Defendant requested that the lower court stay the breach of contract and bad faith 
claims pending a resolution of Plaintiffs' claim for UIM benefits in an arbitration proceeding. 
Plaintiffs conceded that their UIM claim should be resolved in arbitration, but argued that 
they were not required to arbitrate their breach of contract or bad faith claim and requested the 
court sever the breach of contract and bad faith claim from the UIM claim which "probably 
should be arbitrated in accordance with Defendant's motion and the policy's arbitration 
provision." (R. 104). Subsequently, Plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate the matter but, simultaneously 
with the arbitration, wanted to proceed forward with the breach of contract and bad faith action. 
Plaintiffs also filed a motion to compel responses to requests for admissions and requests 
for production of documents pertaining to the bad faith claim. In response, Defendant sought a 
3 
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protective order requesting that it be protected from responding to discovery associated with the 
bad faith claim until Plaintiffs had established that they were "legally entitled" to UIM benefits 
under the policy. Farmers maintained that the discovery sought by Plaintiffs in connection with 
their bad faith claim would prejudice Defendant's position against Plaintiffs in the arbitration 
proceeding to determine whether Plaintiffs were entitled to UIM benefits. 
Following a hearing on Plaintiffs' Rule 37 Motion for an Order Compelling Discovery, 
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Request to Stay Breach of Contract, Bad Faith 
and Associated Causes, and Defendant's Motion for Protective Order Pursuant to Rule 26(c), the 
court ordered that Plaintiffs' breach of contract action be stayed pending arbitration of Plaintiffs' 
claim for UIM benefits, but denied Defendant's request to stay the bad faith claim. In addition, 
Plaintiffs' motion to compel Defendant's responses to requests for admissions and requests for 
production of documents was granted as to the requests for admissions (but since a copy of the 
requests for production of documents had not been provided to the court, the court made no 
ruling on the motion to compel with regard to those, nor on Defendant's motion for protective 
order regarding the same). 
Defendant subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that before Plaintiffs 
could recover for either breach of contract or bad faith, they must first establish that they were 
"legally entitled" to UIM benefits and, therefore, all proceedings should be stayed pending a 
resolution of the "legal entitlement" issue. Defendant further argued that discovery in connection 
4 
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with Plaintiffs' bad faith claim was inappropriate and prejudicial to Defendant until Plaintiffs had 
shown that they were "legally entitled" to the contract benefits. Plaintiffs opposed Defendant's 
motion for reconsideration, arguing that establishing "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits was not 
a prerequisite to filing a claim for bad faith and that such a claim could be based on the refusal to 
bargain or settle, standing alone. The court denied Defendant's motion for reconsideration and, 
now having seen the requests for production of documents, granted Plaintiffs' motion to compel 
Defendant's responses to the requests and denied Defendant's motion for a protective order (with 
the exception of Request No. 10, which was subject to the protective order) (R. 175). In 
addition, the court denied Defendant's request to stay its order pending a decision on the Petition 
for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, which had been filed. Defendant then filed a 
Motion for Expedited Stay in this Court, which was granted on November 25, 2003 pending a 
decision on the petition for interlocutory appeal. 
In the meantime, Scott Daniels, the arbitrator on Plaintiffs' UIM claim, issued his 
decision on December 8, 2003 finding: that Plaintiff Byron Christiansen was scheduled to 
undergo cervical surgery during the week following the arbitration; that the settlement from the 
tortfeasor's liability carrier was reasonable until it was determined that Mr. Christiansen needed 
surgery; that Mr. Christiansen had not proven his claim for loss of past or future income as a 
result of the underlying motor vehicle accident, and; that Mr. Christensen had not proven his 
claim for past or future wage loss. Mr. Daniels also determined that Mr. Christiansen had a pre-
5 
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existing condition and, because of this, apportioned the need for the surgery 50% to the accident 
and 50% to pre-existing. Mr. Daniels then awarded general and special damages, based on this 
apportionment and assuming that Mr. Christensen was going to have surgery, in the amount of 
$74,867.50, which amounted to 50% of the costs that were attributable to the motor vehicle 
accident. In doing so, the arbitrator also decided to retain jurisdiction to modify the award if Mr. 
Christiansen did not proceed with his scheduled surgery (Exhibit 1 to Motion to Set Aside 
Permission for Interlocutory Appeal Due to Change in Circumstances filed by Plaintiffs with this 
Court) (Addendum). On December 10, 2003, Defendant's petition for interlocutory appeal was 
granted. 
Plaintiffs then filed a motion to set aside the interlocutory appeal arguing that "if there 
was any need to demonstrate 'legal entitlement' to UIM benefits before proceeding on the bad 
faith claim", the arbitration award satisfied that. This Court, however, ordered that the issues 
raised in the interlocutory appeal proceed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 10, 2001, Plaintiff Byron Christiansen was involved in a motor vehicle accident 
with Umar Raja. As a result of this accident, Mr.Christiansen claimed personal injuries and Mrs. 
Christiansen claimed additional household services and compensation for past and future 
personal care of Mr. Christiansen (Plaintiffs' Complaint, R. 1-8). Mr. Christiansen subsequently 
settled with Mr. Raja's automobile liability carrier for $50,000, the policy limits (Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, R. 1-8). Plaintiff Byron Christiansen then filed a claim for UIM benefits with 
6 
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Farmers, his own insurance carrier, specifically seeking the UIM limits under his policy 
(Plaintiffs'Complaint, R. 4; R. 73-74). 
On August 19,2002, Plaintiffs then made a demand for the UIM policy limits (R. 44-94). 
On October 24, 2002, Farmers retained Mike Hansen to evaluate and/or arbitrate Plaintiffs' 
request for the UIM benefits. In furtherance of this, Mr. Hansen requested various documents 
from Plaintiffs and also that Plaintiff Byron Christiansen submit to a sworn statement. That 
sworn statement was set for November 1, 2002 at 11:00 a.m. (R. 76). Plaintiff failed to timely 
provide the information requested by Mr. Hansen. For example, the income tax returns were 
provided on the morning of the scheduled sworn statement (R. 76, 80). Plaintiffs' counsel sent 
additional information concerning his clients' UIM claim to counsel for Farmers on November 
12, 2002, November 25, 2002 and by fax on March 11, 2003 (R. 82, 85, 92-93). Information 
sent on March 11, 2003 was a list of 15 medical providers seen by Plaintiff Byron Christiansen 
(R.93). 
On April 11, 2003, Plaintiffs filed suit in Third District Court alleging breach of contract, 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of fiduciary duty (R. 1-
8). In response, Ms. Maw was retained to defend Farmers. After filing an answer, Defendant 
then filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Request to Stay Breach of Contract, Bad Faith and 
Associated Causes (R. 31-32). Defendant also filed a Motion for Protective Order in response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel (R. 42-43, 128-129). As previously set forth in the "Statement of 
7 
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the Case", the court ordered that Plaintiffs' UIM claim be resolved in arbitration, even though the 
parties had already stipulated to this, and granted Defendant's request to stay the breach of 
contract action, but denied Defendant's request to stay the bad faith action and ordered discovery 
that would be pertinent, if at all, only to the bad faith action to proceed. (R. 172-176, 231, 233-
235). 
On December 4, 2003, Plaintiffs' UIM claim was arbitrated by Scott Daniels. The 
arbitrator issued his ruling on December 8, 2003, finding that Mr. Christiansen was set to have 
cervical surgery the week following the arbitration, which would cost $49,735 in addition to 
medical costs previously incurred as a result of the accident of May 10, 2001. He also found that 
Mr. Christensen aggravated a pre-existing, non-symptomatic degenerative cervical condition, but 
that by July 18, 2001, he had improved considerably. Mr. Daniels also determined that Mr. 
Christiansen had a relapse at the end of July and into August of 2001, possibly due to several 
mechanisms unrelated to this motor vehicle suggested by the arbitrator and, in any event, Mr. 
Christiansen's problems at the time of the December 4, 2003 arbitration were a combination of a 
pre-existing condition, the automobile accident (noted as being very minor), and whatever 
triggered the July, 2001 setback. Further, that the settlement from the (tortfeasor's) liability 
carrier was reasonable prior to learning that he was to have surgery the week after the arbitration 
and that the accident was 50% responsible for the need for this surgery and, therefore, the 
Christiansens were entitled to the sum of $74,867.50, representing one-half of the cost of surgery 
and one-half of the total general damages awarded associated with the surgery (included in the 
8 
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general damages was an amount for Merrilee Christiansen's loss as a result of having to work 
more in the business). Mr. Daniels determined that the Christiansens were not entitled to interest 
on the medical specials in that they had not yet been incurred. Finally, the arbitrator indicated 
that he would retain jurisdiction to modify the award if the petitioner did not have the scheduled 
surgery (Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Permission for Interlocutory Appeal Due to 
Change in Circumstances) (Addendum). The arbitrator's award was paid by Farmers to Byron 
Christiansen on December 15, 2003. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiffs' claim for UIM benefits is determined by their insurance policy. That policy 
provides UIM benefits as follows: 
We will pay all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to recover as 
damages from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of 
bodily injury sustained by the insured driver while occupying your insured car. 
(Second Edition, E-Z Reader Car Policy, Utah p. 8.) (R. 123) (Emphasis added) 
This provision is consistent with Utah's underinsured motorist statute, U.C.A. §31A-22-
305(9)(a), which provides for underinsured motorist coverage "for covered persons who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles 
because of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death." (Emphasis added) 
Utah case law interpreting the "legally entitled" to language established that this can be 
shown by either obtaining a judgment or with a formal or informal settlement among the parties. 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In this case, the parties could not reach an agreement on Plaintiffs' "legal entitlement" to recover 
UIM benefits, and opted to resolve this pursuant to the arbitration provision in the policy. 
Plaintiffs have ignored the legal significance of this "legally entitled" to language and 
instead rely on Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Ut. 1985) for the proposition that a 
refusal to bargain or settle, standing along, may be sufficient to prove bad faith, in essence 
creating an independent tort. However, in Beck, the Plaintiff was already determined to be 
"legally entitled" to the uninsured motorist benefits. For this reason, and others, the Beck 
language does not negate that Plaintiffs are required to first establish that they are "legally 
entitled" to UIM benefits, before pursuing a bad faith claim against their insurance company. 
This position was confirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 
(Ut. 1997), wherein the Court made it clear that "legal entitlement" to the policy benefits must be 
shown before a bad faith claim can be brought against the insurance company. 
Here, where Plaintiffs simultaneously filed their claim for benefits under their insurance 
contract and their breach of contract and bad faith claim against the insurance company, the bad 
faith claim should have been stayed pending a showing not only of "legal entitlement" to UIM 
benefits, but breach of contract as well. This then requires that Plaintiffs first establish that they 
are "legally entitled" to benefits, which the parties and trial court agreed would be determined by 
arbitration. 
10 
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The trial court, however, while staying the breach of contract action, incorrectly refused 
to stay the proceedings on Plaintiffs' bad faith action. Having wrongfully allowed the bad faith 
action to go forward, the trial court also denied Defendant's request for a protective order and 
allowed Plaintiffs to pursue discovery purportedly sought in connection with their bad faith 
claim, but which would prejudice the arbitration of the claim for UIM benefits. This prejudice 
was demonstrated by the very materials sought by Plaintiffs in this case. For example, Plaintiffs 
sought the claims file, which contained the thoughts and impressions of the claims handlers, as 
well as information regarding settlement value and any possible reserves set. Defendant was 
placed in the position of having to comply with the court's order that it produce responses to the 
discovery which could then be used by Plaintiffs to establish "legal entitlement" to the UM 
benefits. This information would not be discoverable in connection with the UIM claim. 
Discovery, therefore, should not have been permitted until Plaintiffs first established that they 
were "legally entitled" to receive the UIM benefits under the policy. 
The petition for interlocutory appeal was granted before "legal entitlement" was shown. 
However, showing of "legal entitlement" is not synonymous with a finding of breach of contract 
or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Rather, it further demonstrates 
the need for the Court to outline the required analysis necessary in adjudicating a bad faith claim 
after a finding of "legal entitlement" to the benefits under the policy. The policy provided a 
procedure for resolution of questions of "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits, through arbitration. 
11 
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The claim was arbitrated, an award was made, and it was promptly paid by the insurance 
company. The arbitrator's decision was not without reservation, for example the arbitrator had 
questions regarding the cause of Byron Christiansen's relapse several months after the accident in 
question. In addition, the arbitrator found that the settlement from the liability carrier was "a 
reasonable amount to settle the case prior to the determination to have surgery", suggesting that 
Plaintiff Byron Christiansen was not "legally entitled" to recover UIM benefits until the 
determination to have surgery was made shortly before the arbitration. Thus, from the time the 
matter was being evaluated, up until almost the date of arbitration, there could be no breach of 
contract and therefore no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The 
arbitrator also found Plaintiff Byron Christiansen was not "legally entitled" to recover benefits 
for lost wages. This is all suggestive that there was no breach of contract. This is further 
corroborated by the arbitrator retaining jurisdiction over the matter in the event Mr. Christiansen 
didn't have surgery, suggesting then that if he failed to show "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits 
there could be no breach of contract or bad faith. 
A finding of "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits does not mean that a breach of contract 
has now occurred. In order to have a breach of contract, as one of the essential elements, 
Plaintiffs must show damages. In this regard, the only potential damage would be attorney's 
fees. The significance of this is that the insurance policy expressly provides that attorney's fees 
incurred in connection with an arbitration proceeding to determine "legal entitlement" to UIM 
12 
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benefits are to be paid by the party incurring them. Absent any evidence of damages, and in light 
of the express contractual provisions stating that attorney's fees incurred in connection with 
establishing "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits, an award of attorney's fees would not be 
appropriate. It follows then, that if the only damage Plaintiffs can show is attorney's fees, and 
that is expressly excluded from the contract, there can be no breach of contract. 
Finally, in the analysis of an insured's claim against his insurer, a determination that the 
insured is "legally entitled" to UIM benefits and a finding that the insurance company has 
breached its insurance contract, does not establish that the insurer breached the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. It is well established under Utah case law that: "If the evidence 
presented creates a factual issue as to the claim's validity, there exists a debatable reason for 
denial, thereby legitimizing the denial of the claim, and eliminating the bad faith claim." Callioux 
v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842 (Ut. App. 1987). If a plaintiff s claim is fairly 
debatable, an insurance company should not be found to have breached the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. This suggests that if Plaintiffs first show "legal entitlement", then 
breach, they still have to provide evidence of bad faith. This is especially the case since the 
defense to a bad faith claim is whether the claim was arguably "fairly debatable". 
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ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
PLAINTIFFS MUST SHOW "LEGAL ENTITLEMENT" 
TO THE U M BENEFITS 
The insurance policy in effect at the time of the loss determines whether there is 
coverage. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 532 (Ut. 2002). In this regard, the 
Farmers policy, specifically the provisions for UIM benefits, provides as follows: 
We will pay all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to recover as 
damages from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of 
bodily injury sustained by the insured driver while occupying your insured car. 
(Second Edition, E-Z Reader Car Policy, Utah p. 8). (Emphasis added) 
This provision is consistent with Utah law, U.C.A. §31A-22-305(9)(a), which provides 
for underinsured motorist coverage "for covered persons who are "legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death." (Emphasis added.) 
The meaning of "legally entitled" to recover damages has been addressed in numerous 
Utah decisions. Further, case law in other jurisdictions suggests that this can be decided as a 
matter of law. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nacchia, 628 A.2d 48 (Del. 1993); Farmers 
Alliance Mutual Ins. Co. v. Holeman, 961 P.2d 114 (Mt. 1998). The Utah Supreme Court 
addressed the "legally entitled" to language for the first time in the case of Lyon v. Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity Co., 480 P.2d 739 (Ut. 1971) (overruled on other grounds by Beck, supra). 
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In Lyon, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the "legally entitled" to language of an uninsured 
motorist provision of an insurance policy and stated that the insurer's obligations "did not arise 
until there was a legal determination of the liability of the uninsured motorist and the extent of 
the damages sustained." Id. at 744. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue again in Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 
(Ut. 1982) where, in the context of an uninsured motorist policy, it held that: 
. . . [t]his showing of legal entitlement typically entails a lawsuit against the 
uninsured tortfeasor to litigate the issues of liability and damages. A judgment 
favorable to the insured fixes the insurer's contractual duty to satisfy that 
judgment, within the policy limits. 
M a t 281. 
In 1996, the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted "legally entitled" to within the context of 
underinsured motorist coverage in the case oi Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 
192 (Ut. App. 1996), where the court held that the insurer's obligation under UM and UIM 
statutes (which are construed identically by the court in this context) did not arise until there is 
"'a legal determination of liability of the [under-] insured motorist and the extent of the damages 
sustained.'" 927 P.2d 192, 196, citing Lyon, 480 P.2d at 745. That legal determination is a 
favorable judgment which fixes the insurance company's contractual duty. 
More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals considered the "legally entitled" to recover 
language of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in Estate ofBerkemeir ex rel. Nielsen 
v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest, 67 P.3d 1012 (Ut. App. 2003). Relying on the Utah Supreme 
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Court's decision in Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Or., 15 P.3d 1030 (Ut. 2000), the court of 
appeals chose not to adopt the more rigorous standard previously set forth in Peterson, Lima and 
Lyon, but rather elected to use a less vigorous standard where the party need only show the 
existence of a "viable claim that is able to be reduced to judgment". Id. at 1015. (Court's 
emphasis.) Absent specific language to the contrary, such a showing is sufficient. This showing 
can be made "with either a judgment entered by the trial court, or a formal, or informal, 
settlement agreement between the parties." This appears to be a distinction without a difference. 
In the Berkemeir case, the insurance company had agreed to settle the claim for uninsured 
motorist coverage. The insurance company also informally acknowledged that the plaintiffs 
injuries exceeded the uninsured motorist coverage, and agreed to determine the amount due 
under UIM coverage through arbitration. When the plaintiff then died, the insurance company 
reneged on the agreement to arbitrate. 
In the case pending before the court, there had been no formal or informal settlement 
agreement between Farmers and the Christiansens. Farmers had agreed to allow the 
Christiansens to enter into a settlement agreement with the tortfeasor's carrier, but had not 
admitted that the value of Plaintiffs' claim exceeded the amount which had already been paid to 
them by the tortfeasor's carrier. Farmers sought to compel the Plaintiffs to resolve their claim for 
UIM benefits in arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the insurance policy and to stay the 
causes of action for breach of contract and bad faith pending a determination of whether 
Plaintiffs were found to be "legally entitled" to UIM benefits in arbitration. Farmers argued that 
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its duty to pay any UM benefits did not arise until there had been a determination of Plaintiffs' 
"legal entitlement" to UIM benefits in arbitration (since the parties could not agree as to the value 
of Plaintiffs' claims). Farmers argued that such a showing of "legal entitlement" to the contract 
benefits, in turn, was a prerequisite to determining whether a breach of contract had occurred, a 
prerequisite to maintaining a cause of action for bad faith. 
A. Under the Beck Case. Plaintiffs Must Still Establish "Legal Entitlemenfto UM Benefits 
Before Pursuing a Bad Faith Claim. 
Relying on the decision of this Court in Beck supra, Plaintiffs argue that they are not 
required to establish that they are "legally entitled" to UM benefits before pursuing their claim 
for bad faith. Although the Beck decision does state that under certain circumstances, a refusal to 
bargain or settle, standing alone, may be sufficient to prove bad faith, it does so in the context of 
the claimant in that case having already been determined to be "legally entitled" to uninsured 
motorist benefits, a prerequisite to maintaining a cause of action for bad faith. Because such a 
showing had not yet been made in this case, Farmers sought to stay Plaintiffs' claims for breach 
of contract and bad faith. 
In Beck, claimant made a policy limits demand for uninsured motorist benefits. The 
insurance adjuster rejected the policy limits demand and the claimant then filed a lawsuit against 
his own insurance carrier, alleging breach of the contract for refusing to pay his UM claim and 
that, by refusing to investigate the claim, bargain with its insured, or settle, the insurance 
company also breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (bad faith). Claimant 
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also alleged emotional distress. In Beck, the trial court bifurcated the case and agreed to try the 
claim for failure to pay UM benefits independent of the bad faith claim. Subsequently, the 
claimant and the insurance company agreed to settle the UM claim and that claim was dismissed. 
Settlement of the claimant's UM claim established his "legal entitlement" to the UM benefits 
under the contract. Estate ofBerkemeir, supra. The trial court then addressed the bad faith 
claim. 
It should also be noted that Beck differs from this case in that Beck involved a claim for 
uninsured motorist benefits. The plaintiff in Beck claimed that he was forced to accept a 
settlement of his uninsured motorist claim because he had essentially received nothing on behalf 
of the uninsured tortfeasor. Plaintiffs in this case had, in fact, already been paid $50,000 on 
behalf of the tortfeasor in addition to the no-fault benefits paid by Defendant and were seeking 
additional amounts in UIM benefits. Defendant, in invoking the arbitration provisions of its 
policy with Plaintiffs, maintained that Plaintiffs had not established that they were entitled to 
additional compensation for any losses which they may have sustained or, if they were entitled to 
additional compensation, how much they were entitled to. The "certain circumstances" which 
might exist in a claim for uninsured motorist benefits like Beck, where a refusal to bargain or 
settle, standing alone, might be sufficient to prove bad faith, simply do not exist in this case. 
The Beck decision does not alter the fact that Plaintiffs must first establish that they are 
"legally entitled" to UIM benefits. This is also supported by the Utah Supreme Court's decision 
in Chatterton. In that case, the plaintiff sought materials in discovery which were perhaps 
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relevant to a bad faith claim against the insurance company. In rejecting the plaintiffs efforts to 
obtain such materials, the court stated "[a]s it has not yet been determined whether State Farm is 
liable for payment under the uninsured motorist provision, there is no ground upon which to 
construct a case against State Farm for bad faith." (Emphasis added, citing Beck as support for 
this proposition, Id. at 263.) In relying upon Beck, the court in Chatterton refused to allow 
discovery in a potential bad faith claim absent first showing that plaintiff was "legally entitled" to 
benefits alleged under the insurance contract. 
Finally, Plaintiffs' position that Defendants' failure to respond to their settlement demand 
is automatically bad faith, seemingly creates an independent tort and ignores the language in 
Beck, which is undisputed, that a first party relationship is considered a contractual one, not one 
in tort. Further, it seems to suggest that there can be strict liability for bad faith, which would 
negate the "fairly debatable" defense. {Prince v. Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, 56 P.3d 
524, 535 (Ut. 2002). (See also point IV(A)). 
POINTH 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR BAD FAITH SHOULD HAVE BEEN STAYED 
PENDING SHOWING A BREACH OF CONTRACT 
According to the contract and Utah law, Farmers' duty to pay benefits under the contract 
did not arise until Plaintiffs established that they were "legally entitled" to recover the benefits. 
Because the parties in this case could not agree as to the value, if any, of Plaintiffs' UEVt claims, 
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the contract specified that Plaintiffs were required to establish their "legal entitlement" to UIM 
benefits through arbitration. Farmers' duty to pay did not arise until the arbitrator determined 
that Plaintiffs were "legally entitled" to benefits under their insurance policy. While the trial 
court properly ordered the determination of "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits to be made in 
arbitration and stayed Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract, it erroneously permitted the bad 
faith claim to proceed. The trial court's action failed to take into account that the bad faith claim 
in this case is a contract, not a tort claim, so that any claim for bad faith is predicated first on 
showing "legal entitlement" to the benefits and, further, that the contract has been breached. 
The Supreme Court in Beck, supra, distinguished between a first and third party 
relationship, finding that a first party relationship, i.e. between the policyholder and the insurance 
company, is contractual. Under Beck, this meant that an insured could not bring an action for bad 
faith against his or her insurer, until a breach of that contract was established. Although the Beck 
decision did contain language holding that the refusal to bargain or settle, standing alone, may, 
under appropriate circumstances, be sufficient to prove a breach of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing implied in all contracts, this does not mean that in a first party relationship bad faith can 
exist as an independent tort, especially since a defense to a claim of bad faith is whether the 
refusal to bargain or settle is "fairly debatable". It is important to remember that, in Beck, the 
claimant was already determined to be "legally entitled" to uninsured motorist (UM) benefits, a 
prerequisite to maintaining a cause of action for breach of contract and bad faith. 
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It is clear that the insureds may not just simply file a bad faith claim without having first 
established that they are "legally entitled" to the contract benefits and, second, that the insurance 
company breached the contract. See the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Chatterton, supra, in 
which the court rejected the effort of a claimant to obtain discovery relevant only to a bad faith 
action from his own insurance carrier in connection with his claim for uninsured motorist 
benefits. In this regard, the Utah Supreme Court refused to permit the claimant to obtain 
"extensive discovery that he has conceded is primarily directed at exploring the possibility of 
pursuing a bad faith claim" against his uninsured motorist carrier. The court stated: "[a]s it has 
not vet been determined whether State Farm is liable for payment under the uninsured motorist 
provision, there is no ground upon which to construct a case against State Farm for bad faith." 
(Emphasis added.) (Citing Beck as support for this proposition.) Id. at 263. 
Defendant's position that there must be a showing of breach of contract and not just a 
failure by Defendant to pay what Plaintiff has demanded, is supported by cases in other 
jurisdictions as well. These decisions reiterate that Plaintiffs must first establish that the 
insurance contract has been breached before they are entitled to pursue their claim for bad faith. 
In Imperial Casualty and Indemnity Co. v. Bellini, 746 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000), the 
insurance company sought to sever the bad faith claim from the claim for insurance coverage and 
to limit discovery sought in connection with the bad faith claim. The Rhode Island Supreme 
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Court agreed to sever the coverage issues from the bad faith issues finding that the discovery 
sought in connection with the bad faith claim should be deferred until plaintiff had established 
the underlying breach of contract claim. In reaching this decision the court cited to its decision in 
Bartlett v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 997 (R.I. 1988), wherein the court 
stated: 
There can be no cause of action for an insurer's badfaith [sic] refusal to pay a 
claim until the insured first establishes that the insurer breached its duty under the 
contract of insurance.... If the insurer prevails on the breach of contract action, 
it could not, as a matter of law, have acted in bad faith in its relationship with its 
policyholder. There cannot be a showing of bad faith when the insurer is able to 
demonstrate a reasonable basis for denying benefits. 
Bartlett 2X1000. 
Moreover, the Rhode Island court agreed with the reasoning in Bartlett that "allowing full 
disclosure of the insurer's claims file based solely on plaintiffs allegation of bad faith would 
invite all plaintiffs to include a bad faith claim with every breach of contract claim." Id. at 134 
(citing Bartlett). The Rhode Island Supreme Court did acknowledge that the claims file may 
provide information to prove a bad faith claim, but determined that the need for this information 
"is outweighed first by the insurer's right to defend itself against the breach of contract claim and 
second by the fact that a bad faith claim cannot be maintained until the plaintiff proves that the 
insurer breached its contract of insurance." Id. at 135. 
In O'Malley v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar., 776 F.2d 494 (U.S.C.A. 5th Cir. Miss. 1985), 
O'Malley brought suit against his insurance company, alleging breach of contract and bad faith 
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by failing to properly investigate the claim and pay for losses. The insurer denied liability 
pursuant to an exclusionary clause in the insurance contract. The district court bifurcated the 
trial, hearing evidence and testimony only on the issue of whether the losses were covered by the 
policy because plaintiff could not have recovered on the bad faith claim unless he prevailed on 
the contract claim. O'Malley appealed and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
decision to bifurcate, reasoning that". . . recovery on the bad faith claim would not have been 
possible unless O'Malley prevailed on his coverage claim." Id. 501. 
In South Hampton Refining Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. 875 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. 
Tex. 1995) plaintiff brought claims against National Union for breach of contract, negligence, 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the Texas 
Insurance Code. With respect to these claims, the court determined that severance was 
appropriate and, in doing so, the court held that "in insurance coverage suits, a plaintiffs bad 
faith claims generally depend on the outcome of contractual coverage claims and are usually 
severed." Id. 384. More specifically: 
The court also noted that plaintiffs bad faith claims, a violation of the Insurance 
Code claims and Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims all depended on the 
outcome of the contractual coverage dispute, (cit.) The court further ordered an 
abatement of all other claims pending resolution of the contractual coverage issues 
Id. at 384 (citing with approval U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard, 847 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1993)) (emphasis added). 
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A series of cases in Florida asserting a statutory action for bad faith against an insurance 
company have held that it is premature to file such an action for bad faith until there has been a 
determination of liability and the extent of damages owed on the first party insurance contract. 
The Florida Supreme Court, addressing questions of Florida law certified by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that an insured's claim against his uninsured 
motorist carrier's failure to settle his uninsured motorist claim in good faith did not accrue before 
the conclusion of the underlying litigation for the contractual uninsured motorist benefits. A 
series of subsequent Florida district court decisions reiterated this point and held that the bad 
faith claims raised by insureds against their insurance company for failure to settle should 
alternatively be dismissed without prejudice or abated pending resolution of the coverage issues. 
Moreover, these decisions halted discovery related to issues pertaining to the insured's claim of 
bad faith against their insurance companies. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farm, Inc., 754 So.2d 
865 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 2000) where the court held that bringing an action for statutory bad faith 
was premature before a determination of coverage and the amount of damages owed under the 
policy (citing Vest v. Travelers Ins. Co., 753 So.2d 1270, 1276 (Fla. 2000)). See also General 
Starlndem. Co. v. Anheuser Busch Companies, Inc., 741 So.2d 1259 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1999) 
(comparing a third party bad faith to first party bad faith cause of action and reiterating the 
necessity of resolving coverage and liability issues first and that no discovery on the bad faith 
claim should proceed until coverage has been resolved); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Baughman, 741 So. 
2d 624 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1999) (the statutory bad faith claim for failure to settle an insurance 
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claim should have been dismissed without prejudice or, alternatively, abated); and Doan v. John 
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 So.2d 400 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1999) (resolution of coverage 
dispute on disability insurance claim necessary before deciding bad faith claim). See also Talat 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Aetna Life and Cas., 952 F. Supp. 773 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Michigan Millers 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bourke, 581 So.2d 1368 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1991); and Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Melendez, 550 So.2d 156 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1989). 
In the case of Walden v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 951 P.2d 949 (Id. 1998), the insured 
brought a cause of action against her uninsured motorist carrier for breach of contract and bad 
faith. The insured had submitted a "proof of loss" to her insurer and demanded the policy limits 
under the UM portion of her policy. The insurer responded and indicated it did not believe her 
claim was a limits case and demanded arbitration. The insurance company advised plaintiffs 
counsel of the name of the arbitrator it wished to designate. The plaintiff, however, did not 
designate her own arbitrator but instead filed suit against the insurance company alleging breach 
of contract for failing to pay "an amount justly due." The policy contained a similar provision to 
that contained in the Farmers policy issued to Plaintiffs in this case, providing for "arbitration in 
the event that the insurance company and the insured do not agree about the insured's right to 
recover damages or the amount of the damages." The court found that the insurance company 
was entitled, pursuant to the terms of its policy, to have the amount of damages determined in 
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arbitration. It held that the insurance company was not in breach of contract and did not act in 
bad faith in relying on the contractual provisions for arbitration. 
The Federal District Court in Nevada in the case of Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co., 960 F. Supp. 233 (D. Ne. 1997), reviewed Nevada case law and that of other jurisdictions 
involving uninsured motorist coverage and bad faith claims and found that a majority of 
jurisdictions hold that a bad faith claim either does not exist or should be held in abeyance until 
there is a final resolution of the contractual coverage claim. Citing, for example, Blanchard v. 
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 575 So.2d 1289 (Fla. 1991). 
Similar decisions have been reached by the Court of Appeals in Georgia. In the case of 
Wallis v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 354 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. App. 1987), the parents of a man who 
died from injuries incurred in a collision with an uninsured motorist filed a demand for payment 
with their son's uninsured motorist carrier. Georgia's bad faith statute required uninsured 
motorist benefits to be paid within 60 days after demand for payment was made, However, the 
court held that the insurer was not liable for bad faith penalties for failure to pay within the 60 
days where the demand was made prior to entry of judgment against the uninsured motorist, but 
noted that since the insurer is liable for the amount which the insured "shall be legally entitled to 
recover" from the uninsured motorist, liability for damages "should be ascertained in an 
appropriate forum before bringing the suit against the insurance company under such coverage." 
Id. at 843. It further stated that: 
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. . . an insurer has no duty to accept an insured's demand for payment of a claim 
prior to judgment being entered against an uninsured motorist. Inasmuch as the 
insurer is not required to make payment or settlement, it defies logic to argue that 
[the insurer] could have acted in bad faith in failing to pay the claim prior to 
judgment in the tort case. 
Id. at 843 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. McCall, 305 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. App. 1983). See also Jones v. 
Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 363 S.E.2d 303 (Ga. App. 1987). 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Chatterton firmly establishes that Plaintiffs in this 
case could not pursue their cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing (bad faith) until they had established that they were "legally entitled" to the contract 
benefits. In addition, for the reasons set forth in Point HI below, pending a showing by Plaintiffs 
that they are first "legally entitled" to benefits under the contract and, second, that there has been 
a breach of contract, the claim for bad faith should be stayed since failure to do so is not only 
improper but also prejudices the insurance company. 
POINT m 
DISCOVERY IN A BAD FAITH ACTION IS INAPPROPRIATE UNTIL 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY ARE "LEGALLY ENTITLED" TO 
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS 
In this case, in connection with their efforts to establish a claim for bad faith against 
Defendant, Plaintiffs have sought information pertaining to the liability and valuation which 
Defendant might have made concerning Plaintiffs' UIM claim. This information, if produced 
prior to the determination of Plaintiffs' "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits, prejudices Defendant 
in the then still-pending arbitration. In seeking the stay of the bad faith action and protection 
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from Plaintiffs' discovery requests, Defendant had argued that since Plaintiffs' entitlement to 
UIM benefits and if, in fact, entitled to such benefits, how much they were entitled to, had yet to 
be resolved, Defendant should not be prejudiced in the resolution of Plaintiffs' UIM claims by 
being forced to proceed with the discovery requests made in connection with Plaintiffs' bad faith 
claim against Defendant. As noted by this court in Beck, supra, Defendant argued that with 
regard to Plaintiffs' first party claim for UIM benefits, Plaintiffs and Defendant were "in effect 
and practically speaking, adversaries." Id. 799. 
The court's decision in Chatteron, supra, made clear that discovery in a bad faith case is 
inappropriate until Plaintiffs have shown "legal entitlement" to the contract benefits. As 
indicated earlier, the court there refused to allow plaintiffs discovery requests directed at 
exploring the possibility of a bad faith claim against an insurance company until it was first 
determined that the insurance company was liable under the uninsured motorist provisions of its 
policy. 
The position taken by the court in Chatterton, supra, is consistent with that taken by the 
Texas Court of Appeals in State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Wilborn, 835 S.W. 2d 260 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1992), wherein the court addressed issues raised by trying an uninsured motorist claim with 
a claim for bad faith and an insurance company's plea to abate the bad faith claim until the 
uninsured motorist claim was resolved. The court recognized that information pertaining to 
offers of settlement and compromise would be inadmissible under Rule 408 of the Texas (and 
Utah) Rules of Evidence in the resolution of an uninsured motorist claim, yet this same 
28 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
information was sought as the basis for plaintiffs bad faith claim against defendant. The court 
noted that information such as offers to settle sought in connection with bad faith litigation 
would not be admissible in connection with resolution of an uninsured motorist claim since the 
basic rule that settlement offers are not admissible to show liability for or the invalidity of a 
claim or its amount would be violated. In order to allow both the claim for UIM benefits and the 
claim for bad faith to be fully and fairly litigated, the court reversed the trial court's decision and 
severed the two causes of action, abating all proceedings on the bad faith cause of action until 
final disposition on the uninsured motorist claim. See also Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Texas v. 
Lerner, 901 S.W. 2d 749 (Tex. Ct. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), wherein the Texas Court of 
Appeals held that "the breach of contract claim and the extracontractual bad faith claims must be 
severed. In addition, the bad faith claims must be abated until the breach of contract issue is 
finally resolved for all purposes." See also U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard, 847 S.W. 2d 668 (Tex. 
Ct. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1993) wherein the court "directed the trial court to sever and abate 
all proceedings on the bad faith claims pending full and final resolution of plaintiff s uninsured 
motorist claim." Id. 676. See also Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Stem, 927 S.W. 2d 76, 80 (Tex. Ct. 
App. Waco 1996) wherein the court agreed with the holding in Wilborn and determined that the 
defendant [insurance company] "would necessarily be prejudiced in his defense of the plaintiffs 
contract claim if evidence of settlement offers was admitted" and, for this reason, upheld the 
holding in Wilborn (wherein they agreed with the bifurcation of the entitlement to underinsured 
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motorist benefits from the bad faith claim and abated all proceedings of the bad faith pending a 
final disposition of the underinsured motorist claim.) Part of the reason for doing so was 
predicated on the admission of evidence possibly relevant to a bad faith action, but that would be 
highly prejudicial in a determination of UIM benefits. Specifically referred to were offers of 
settlement, which may establish an admission of liability, as well as value. 
In the case of General Star Indemnity Co. v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., supra, the Florida 
Court of Appeals noted that for both first and third party bad faith claims against insurers, 
coverage and liability issues must be determined before bad faith can be prosecuted. It noted that 
"failure to follow this procedure would, in effect, reverse the established case law that discovery 
of an insured's claim file is not permissible until the insured's obligation to provide coverage has 
been established" and that the insurer would be "irreparably harmed" by having to litigate the bad 
faith claim with the coverage claim because the evidence used to prove the bad faith claim would 
prejudice "the coverage issue." Id. at 1261. Discovery was similarly stayed in Michigan Millers 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bourke, supra, in which the court found that a claim for bad faith did not 
accrue until after liability and damages were determined in the underlying contractual litigation 
and abating the bad faith claim against the uninsured motorist carrier, and quashed the order 
compelling discovery of the insurance company's claims file. 
The inherent prejudice resulting from the trial court's refusal to stay the bad faith 
litigation in this case, and ordering Defendant to respond to discovery sought in connection with 
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the bad faith claim prior to resolution of the UIM claim was demonstrated in this case. Plaintiffs 
sought the claims file which contains the thoughts and impressions of the claims handlers and 
has information concerning liability and damages, as well as information regarding settlement 
value, including the reserves set. Defendant was in the untenable position of having to comply 
with the court's order that it produce responses to discovery which would be used by Plaintiffs to 
then bolster their showing of "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits. This is exactly the prejudice 
sought to be avoided by staying litigation in the bad faith claim until the UIM claims were 
resolved. Defendant, an insurance company against whom a bad faith claim was asserted, should 
not have been required to comply with discovery requests which may have been proper in 
connection with their bad faith claim, but which addressed issues concerning settlement and 
valuation of the claim, as well as liability, and which would not be discoverable in connection 
with the UIM claims. Discovery should not be held on those issues until Plaintiffs first 
established that they were "legally entitled" to receive UIM benefits under the insurance contract 
and then establish breach of that contract. 
POINT IV 
DETERMINATION OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENT BY THE ARBITRATOR DOES NOT 
ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT BREACHED THE INSURANCE CONTRACT OR THE 
IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
Inasmuch aslhe arbitration award issued after this Court granted Defendant's Petition to 
Appeal Interlocutory Order established Plaintiffs' "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits, it is 
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important for this Court to outline the required analysis to be made after a finding of "legal 
entitlement" to benefits under the policy. Because Plaintiffs have now been awarded UIM 
benefits in the December, 2003 arbitration, this does not establish that Defendant breached the 
insurance contract or that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover on their claim for bad faith. As 
indicated earlier, the contract between the parties, the insurance policy issued by Farmers to 
Plaintiffs, provided that Farmers pay UIM benefits to its insureds who were "legally entitled" to 
recover damages from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle. The policy 
further provided for arbitration to establish "legal entitlement" to underinsured motorist benefits 
when such benefits could not be agreed upon among the parties. The insurance policy issued to 
Plaintiffs provides as follows: 
If an insured person and we do not agree (1) that the person is 
legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of 
an uninsured motor vehicle or underinsured motor vehicle, or 
(2) as to the amount of damages Uninsured or Underinsured 
Motorist Coverage, either party may make a written demand for 
arbitration. 
In that event, both parties will agree on one arbitrator. If they 
cannot agree within 30 days, either may request that selection be 
made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction. We will pay the 
costs of the arbitrator. Attorney's fees and fees paid for the 
witnesses are not expenses of arbitration and will be paid by the 
party incurring them. 
The arbitrator will determine (1) the existence of an uninsured or 
underinsured motor vehicle, (2) that the insured person is 
legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of 
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an uninsured motor vehicle, and (3) the amount of payment under 
this part as determined by this policy or any other applicable 
policy.... 
In this case, the parties could not agree as to Plaintiffs' "legal entitlement" to UIM 
benefits or, if entitled, the amount. As evidenced by the arbitrator's award in this matter, the 
arbitrator was unclear as to what caused Plaintiff Byron Christiansen's relapse several months 
subsequent to the accident in question. Moreover, his decision indicates that Plaintiff was not 
"legally entitled" to recover underinsured motorist benefits until the determination to have 
surgery was made. (No indication is given as to when this determination was made. However, 
the surgery was apparently scheduled to take place sometime during the week after the December 
8, 2003 award was issued.) The arbitrator devised a formula for apportioning the proximate 
cause of Plaintiff s injuries and surgery to the various possible causes and applied that percentage 
to the cost of Plaintiff s surgery and the resulting general damages associated with Plaintiff 
undergoing that surgery. Although there was no confirmation that Plaintiff did, in fact, elect to 
undergo the surgery, Farmers promptly paid Plaintiffs' claim for UIM benefits. 
The facts as they have been developed at this point do not suggest that there has been any 
breach of contract by Farmers. Plaintiffs were required to produce evidence that they were 
"legally entitled" to recover UIM benefits. The record contains no evidence that they satisfied 
their burden of establishing "legal entitlement" until the arbitrator issued his award on December 
8, 2003. In fact, the arbitrator's decision indicates that Plaintiffs failed to establish "legal 
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entitlement" to compensation for lost wages, evidence of which Farmers counsel had evidently 
been seeking from them since the fall of 2002 when he was first retained to handle the claim. 
Moreover, according to the arbitrator, the settlement from the liability carrier was "a reasonable 
amount to settle the case prior to the determination to have surgery." 
Not persuaded that Plaintiffs had established their "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits, 
Farmers invoked the arbitration provision pursuant to its insurance contract with Plaintiff. 
Plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate the claim and were awarded and promptly paid UIM benefits 
pursuant to the arbitrator's decision. There is no evidence of any breach of contract by Farmers. 
An insurance company is not required to pay every claim submitted to it. 
A. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish the Elements to Show Breach of Contract. 
One of the necessary elements to establish a breach of contract is damages. In this 
regard, arguably the only damages Plaintiffs can claim are attorney's fees in having to arbitrate 
their claim to show "legal entitlement" to the UIM benefits. It should be noted that the insurance 
policy expressly provides that any attorney's fees incurred in connection with an arbitration 
proceeding to determine "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits would be paid by the party incurring 
them. This is important because the remedy for breach of the express terms of an insurance 
contract has been deemed in some Utah cases to include foreseeable attorney's fees. (Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Ut. 1989); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 
461 (Ut. 1996)). Although Utah cases have awarded foreseeable attorney's fees as consequential 
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damages flowing from an insurer's breach of the express terms of an insurance contract, 
Defendant maintains that it has not breached the contract, that attorney's fees incurred because 
Plaintiffs failed to produce evidence to establish their "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits were 
not contemplated at the time the parties entered into the insurance contract, and, most 
importantly, if any fees were awarded, the court would be rewriting the insurance policy to 
require the insurer to assume attorney's fees incurred by the insureds in producing evidence of 
"legal entitlement" to benefits, notwithstanding that the contract expressly provides otherwise. 
This being the case, Plaintiffs do not show that they have been damaged, and therefore cannot 
meet the elements to show that the insurance contract has been breached. If there is no breach of 
contract, there can be no bad faith claim. 
B. The Arbitration Award Does Not Establish Breach of the Implied Covenant Of Good 
Faith And Fair Dealing (Bad Faith). 
The arbitrator's award of UIM benefits to Plaintiffs in this case does not establish that 
Defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing any more than it 
establishes that it breached the insurance contract. It is well established under Utah case law that 
"if the evidence presented creates a factual issue as to the claim's validity, there exists a 
debatable reason for denial, thereby legitimizing the denial of the claim, and eliminating the bad 
faith claim. 'When a claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate it, whether the 
debate concerns a matter of fact or law.'" Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842 
(Ut. App. 1987) (quoting McLaughlin v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 437 So.2d 
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86, 90 (Ala. 1983)). See also Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 535 (Ut. 2002), 
where the court held that if an insured's claim is "fairly debatable", then the insurer is entitled to 
debate the claim and "cannot be held to have breached the implied covenant if it chooses to do 
so." (citing Morris v. HealthNet of California, Inc., 988 P.2d 940 (Ut. 1999); Billings v. Union 
Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 465 (Ut. 1996); Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., supra at 842.) 
In Prince, supra, an insured brought an action for breach of contract, bad faith, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and tortious violation of public policy against 
his automobile insurer because the insurance company, relying on an independent medical 
examiner's report that continued chiropractic care was not medically necessary, discontinued PIP 
payments to the insured. Finding that there was a factual issue as to the validity of the plaintiffs 
claims for continued PIP benefits, the court held that the claim was "fairly debatable" and the 
denial of benefits did not "constitute a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a 
matter of law." Quoting Couch on Insurance 3d §204:28 (1999), the court in Prince stated that 
"a debatable reason" for purposes of determining whether a first party insurer may be subjected 
to bad faith liability means "an arguable reason, a reason that is open to dispute or question." It 
further stated that "to be fairly debatable, evidence must establish that there is an arguable or 
debatable basis underlying the insurer's nonpayment or delayed payment of a claim." Prince, 
supra at 537. 
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This Court in Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Ut. 1996) examined 
whether a first party insurer could be held liable for breaching the implied covenant on the 
grounds that it wrongfully denied coverage if the insured's claim was later found to be proper. 
The court noted that if the insurer acted reasonably in dealing with their insureds, "it is entirely 
consistent... to hold that when an insured's claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to 
debate it and cannot be held to have breached the implied covenant if it chooses to do so." Id. 
465. In a footnote, the court sought to clarify this in light of Beck, noting that although Beck, 
supra, stated that the "state of mind of the insurer is irrelevant; even an inadvertent breach of the 
covenant of good faith implied in an insurance contract can substantially harm the insured and 
warrants a remedy," this statement should not be read as suggesting that the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing imposes a strict liability standard. The court stated that the language in the 
Beck decision did not mean that: 
if a claim is denied and a court later determines it should have been granted, the 
insurer is liable for breaching the implied covenant, regardless of how reasonable 
it was to deny coverage. On the contrary, this statement in Beck was intended 
only to disavow any implication that a "bad faith" state of mind is necessary to 
show a breach of the implied covenant, not to impose strict liability on insurers. 
Id. 465. 
The record here does not contain extensive facts concerning the underlying claim of 
Plaintiffs against Farmers. The file as it exists, however, does contain evidence that Plaintiffs' 
claim was "fairly debatable." The arbitrator's decision notes that Plaintiff Byron Christiansen 
had been paid $4,750 in lost wages by Defendant under the PIP portion of his insurance policy. 
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The record on pages 76-80 indicates that income tax returns sought by Farmers to evaluate 
Plaintiffs' claim for UM benefits were belatedly provided on the morning of Plaintiff s < 
scheduled sworn statement. The arbitrator's decision notes in paragraph 7 that "petitioner has 
not proven an income loss in the past or future as a result of the motor vehicle accident." The 
arbitrator's decision states in paragraph 5 that "the settlement from the liability carrier is a 
reasonable amount to settle the case prior to the determination to have surgery." When Plaintiff 
made his determination to have surgery is not indicated in the award, but it does note that the 
surgery was scheduled for the week following the December 8, 2003 arbitration award. The 
award also provides a rather detailed description of Plaintiff s pre-existing non-symptomatic 
degenerative condition at the time of the accident, the accident exacerbating the degenerative 
condition, causing it to become symptomatic, Plaintiffs improvement with conservative care, 
and then his significant relapse due to reasons which were unclear to the arbitrator but which may 
have included "a long airplane ride, too much activity at a wedding reception, or coughing from 
pneumonia." According to the arbitrator, "any of these events could have triggered the relapse 
and each may be as traumatic as this very minor automobile collision." The court then devises a 
formula for apportioning the proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries among his pre-existing 
condition, the unclear triggering mechanism of July, 2001 and the subject automobile accident. 
The fact that Plaintiff failed to establish any claim for additional lost wages, that until he made a 
determination to have surgery he had been fully compensated by the settlement with the insurer 
of the underlying tortfeasor, and that the surgery to address his ongoing pain followed an unclear 
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triggering mechanism subsequent to the motor vehicle accident are all evidence that this claim 
was "fairly debatable" and that Defendant was therefore entitled to fairly debate the claim. 
In Prince, supra, the court outlined the implied promises of good faith and fair dealing 
that both parties to an insurance contract make. The court stated that "under this covenant, the 
contracting parties each impliedly promise not to 'intentionally or purposefully do anything [that] 
will destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract." Id. 533 (quoting 
Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Ut. 1998)). It is also noted that under this covenant, the 
insurer was required to diligently investigate the facts to enable it to determine whether a claim is 
valid and to fairly evaluate the claim. It is apparent in this mutual covenant imposed on both 
parties to the contract that Plaintiffs must provide the evidence to support their claim for benefits. 
In this case, although Plaintiffs had claimed lost wages, they never successfully substantiated this 
claim. Moreover, the history of Plaintiffs discomfort was a rather complicated one with a relapse 
triggered by unclear mechanisms. Although the accident in question in this case occurred on 
May 10, 2001, surgery was not scheduled until December, 2003. The arbitrator noted that 
Plaintiff was not entitled to interest on the medical specials of $49,735 for surgical costs, as they 
had not yet been incurred. At the very least, Plaintiffs claim was still evolving at the time that it 
was filed with Defendant in August, 2002 and the diligence with which Defendant could evaluate 
Plaintiffs' claims was dependent in part on Plaintiffs timely providing information in support of 
their claim. Once the decision of the arbitrator was rendered on December 8, 2003, Defendant 
promptly paid the claim pursuant to its obligation under the contract. 
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In the case of Calliowc, supra, the plaintiffs' insurer denied their claim for a total loss of 
their vehicle after its investigator and an arson expert concluded that the loss was caused by a 
fire. The claimant was subsequently charged with arson in connection with his alleged 
destruction of the Jeep and for his subsequent attempt to defraud an insurer. After a finding of 
probable cause, the claimant was bound over for trial. The jury found claimant not guilty, and 
the insurance company immediately paid the claim in full. In finding the insurance company 
acted in good faith, the court noted that upon the claimant's acquittal for arson and insurance 
fraud, the insurance company paid the claim in full. Similarly, in this case, the insurance 
company promptly paid the benefits owing once a finding of "legal entitlement" to the UIM 
benefits was made by the arbitrator, having debated a fairly debatable claim. It follows then, that 
an award from the arbitrator, standing alone, is not evidence of bad faith. Rather, in the claim 
here, which was "fairly debatable", Defendant should not be found to have breached the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This also negates Plaintiffs' position that the controlling 
language in the Beck case, which suggests that an insurance company's refusal to bargain, and/or 
accept or reject a settlement, is bad faith. The case law clearly suggests that if the claim is 
deemed "fairly debatable" the insurance company is entitled to debate it and it forms an 
affirmative defense to Plaintiffs' allegations of bad faith. 
Absent a breach of the express terms of the contract and absent a breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, no damages are properly awardable. The UIM benefits 
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were promptly paid upon the arbitrator's determination of "legal entitlement." No interest was 
awarded as the special damages had not yet been incurred and attorney's fees incurred to produce 
evidence of "legal entitlement" are expressly excluded by the contract, are not provided for in the 
UIM statute, and were not contemplated at the time of contracting. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court in this case was incorrect in allowing the bad faith claim against Defendant 
to proceed, before Plaintiffs showed that they were "legally entitled" to recover UIM benefits. 
Further, the trial court was incorrect in its ruling staying the breach of contract action and still 
allowing the bad faith action to go forward, since there must be a showing of breach of contract 
before a cause of action for bad faith can be maintained against the insurance carrier. It was also 
in error in allowing discovery which may be pertinent to a bad faith action to go forward, because 
it may cause discovery of information that may be relevant to a bad faith claim and highly 
prejudicial to the arbitration of the UIM claim. For example, the claims file would contain the 
thoughts and impressions of the claims handler, settlement authority, and the setting of reserves, 
all of which would assist Plaintiffs during the course of the arbitration to determine liability and 
damages. 
The policy itself and Utah law offer a systematic process for analyzing claims filed by an 
insured against his or her insurance carrier. To ignore the requirements of this process by 
allowing claims for bad faith to be filed with every claim for UIM benefits would create a 
situation where insureds would find it advantageous to file a bad faith lawsuit while 
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simultaneously seeking UIM benefits, as well as attorney's fees, every time their demand was not 
met by an insurance company, notwithstanding the fact that they failed to fulfill their 
responsibilities to establish "legal entitlement" to such benefits under the contract. 
Defendant therefore requests that this Court find that the claimant must first show "legal 
entitlement" to the benefits, and that a finding of "legal entitlement" does not equate with breach 
of contract or breach of the implied covenant. This being the case, Defendant requests that this 
Court grant a stay of the bad faith action, pending a determination of whether there has been 
a breach of contract. Defendant also requests this Court stay all discovery related to the bad faith 
claim pending resolution of the breach of contract claim. 
DATED this of March, 2004. 
BARBARA L. M A W 
ANDREA C. ALCABES 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the £- ' day of March, 2004, two copies of the foregoing BRIEF 
OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE ON THE 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, HONORABLE 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Scott D. Brown 
Brian S. Coutts 
NUTTALL, BROWN AND ASSOCIATES 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 210 
Midvale,UT 84047-4198 
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INDEX TO ADDENDUM 
L Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Permission for Interlocutory Appeal Due to Change in 
Circumstances 
2. Utah Code Annotated §31A-22-305~ "Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage1 
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SCOTT D. BROWN, ESQ. #4280 
BRIAN S. COUTTS, ESQ. #8163 
NUTTALL, BROWN AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 210 
Midvale, Utah 84047-4198 
Telephone: (801) 255-2102 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BYRON CHILD CHRISTIANSEN and 
MERRILEE CHRISTIANSEN, husband 
and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
V o . 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE PERMISSION 
FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL DUE 
TO CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES 
Appellate Court No. 20030836-SC 
District Court No. 030908140 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, Byron and Merrilee Christiansen, by and through their attorneys, submit 
this Motion to Set Aside Permission for Interlocutory Appeal due to a significant change in the 
circumstances on which the permission was based. 
Attached as Exhibit One is a copy of Arbitrator Scott Daniels' Arbitration Award in the 
amount of approximately $75,000.00, dated December 8, 2003; together with Farmers' check and the 
fully executed Satisfaction of Arbitration Award. 
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Interestingly, notice of the above Award was received just the day after the Utah Supreme Court 
issued its December 10, 2003 Order (attached as Exhibit Two), granting permission to Petitioner 
Farmers to file an Interlocutory Appeal of Third District Coun Judge Joseph Fratto's denial of 
Farmers' Motion to Stay the Bad Faith action, pending resolution of the Arbitration of the written 
contractual underinsured motorist claim. (Judge Fratto's Order attached as Exhibit Three). 
It is Plaintiffs'/Respondents' understanding that the Arbitration Award renders moot any 
otherwise forthcoming Interlocutory Appeal. If there was any need to demonstrate "legal entitlement" 
to UIM benefits before proceeding on the bad faith claim, the substantial Arbitration Award satisfies 
that. The final resolution of the arbitration also removes any potential for one side of the case to 
prejudice the other. Furthermore, any urgency that may have warranted an interlocutory appeal no 
longer exists. In the Arbitration, Plaintiffs' prevailed on their cause of action for Farmers' breach of 
the written contractual underinsured motorist policy provisions. The only remaining claims are those 
in litigation for breach of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing (i.e., bad faith). 
Consequently, it would be a waste of this Court's resources to proceed to enforce a now meaningless 
stay, and to administer an Interlocutory Appeal which has now been rendered moot by virtue of the 
resolution of the Arbitration confirming Plaintiffs' "legal entitlement". 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs'/Respondents' respectfully request that permission to 
pursue the Interlocutory Appeal be reversed, and that proceedings be allowed to go forward in the 
ordinary course in the breach of the contractual duties of good faith and fair dealing action pending 
before Judge Fratto in the Third Judicial District Court. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of December, 2003. 
SCOTT D. BROWN, ESQ. 
NUTTALL, BROWN AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents 
Bvron and Merrilee Christiansen 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of December, 2003, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO SET ASIDE PERMISSION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL DUE 
TO CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES was mailed via First-Class Mail to the following: 
Attorney Barbara L. Maw 
Law Offices of Barbara L. Maw, P.C. 
185 South State Street, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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EXHIBIT 
ONE 
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In the Matter of the Arbitration Between: 
Byron Christiansen 
and Merrilee Christiansen 
-and-
Farmers Insurance 
The undersigned arbitrator, having been designated in accordance with the arbitration 
agreement signed by the parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, 
FINDS AND AWARDS as follows: 
1. Petitioner (hereinafter "Petitioner" will refer to Mr. Christiansen) was involved in a 
rear end motor vehicle accident on May 10, 2001. Respondent is the underinsured motorist 
carrier. The adverse driver's liability carrier paid its policy limit of $50,000. In addition PIP paid 
petitioner $3000 in medical payments and $4750 in lost wages. 
2. Petitioner has incurred $15,735.20 in medical costs as a result of the accident. In 
addition, it is anticipated that he will need cervical surgery which will cost $49,735. This surgery 
is scheduled for next week. 
3. Petitioner had a pre-existing, non-symptomatic, degenerative cervical condition at 
the time of the accident. The accident aggravated this condition, lighting it up, and causing it to 
become symptomatic. Petitioner's condition improved with conservative care over the months 
following the accident, but he never returned to pre-accident status. By July 18, 2001 he had 
improved considerably. At the end of July and into August of 2001, Petitioner suffered a 
significant relapse. It is unclear what the triggering mechanism for this relapse was. It may have 
been a long airplane ride, too much activity at a wedding reception, or coughing from pneumonia. 
Any of these events could have triggered the relapse, and each may be as traumatic as this very 
minor automobile collision. In any event, Petitioner has continued to experience more pain from 
this time and the evidence indicates that the cause of the problem now is a combination of the pre-
existing degenerative disc disease, the automobile accident and whatever triggered the July 2001 
set back. 
4. Although the Biswell case would indicate that when a condition is aggravated by a 
traumatic incident, the subsequent trauma is the sole proximate cause of the injury, subsequent 
AWARD OF ARBITRATOR 
Case number 03-A-084 
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case law has modified this to the extent that a trier of fact can allocate causation. See Tingy v. 
Christensen 987 P.2d 588 (1999). 
5. The settlement from the liability carrier is a reasonable amount to settle the case 
prior to the determination to have surgery. Prior to the July 2001 point, the only proximate cause 
of the injury was presumed to be the motor vehicle accident. Petitioner had incurred about 
$15,000 in medical expenses. He had undergone considerable pain and suffering, especially in 
wearing a brace for several months in an attempt to stabilize his neck. The settlement did not 
compensate him for the set back that occurred in July of 2001 and persists to the present time. 
6. The accident was- 50% responsiblefor the:neededfiitiire:surgery. The pre-existing 
condition and the triggering mechanism of July 2001 are 50% responsible for the need for 
surgery. 
7. Petitioner has not proven an income loss in the past or future as a result of the 
motor vehicle accident. 
8. Petitioner is entitled to general damages as a result of the surgery. Included in the 
general damage figure is Mrs. Christiansen's loss as a result of having to work more in the 
business, as well as Petitioner's loss of enjoyment of life, pain and suffering associated with the 
surgery and recovery, future medical, fiitaiEadisahility.and future loss of household services. This 
general damage amount is $100,000. 
9. Petitioner is not entitled to interest on the medical specials, in that they have not 
yet been incurred. 
10. The arbitrator will retain jurisdiction to modify the Award if Petitioner determines 
not to have the scheduled surgery. Upjess the parties reqviest return of the medical records in the 
Arbitrator's possession, they will be destroyed within 30 days. 
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Award: 
Cost of Surgery 
General Damages 
Sub Total 
X XA 
$49,735.00 
100,000 
149,735.00 
TOTAL AWARD $74,867.50 
DATED this 8th of December, 2003 
m\ '6id& Scott Daniels Arbitrator 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Scott Daniels, certify that I served the foregoing Award of Arbitrator upon the parties by 
mailing to: 
Mr. Scott D. Brown 
Nuttall & Brown 
6925 Union Park Center #210 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Mr. Michael Hanson 
215 S. State St. #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
First class, postage prepaid, on the 8th day of December 2003 
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Attorneys for Respondent 
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ARBITRATION 
BYRON C. CHRISTIANSEN, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Respondent. 
SATISFACTION OF ARBITRATION AWARD 
Case No. 03-A084 
Arbitrator: Scott Daniels 
An Award of Arbitrator was entered in this matter on December 8, 2003, in the sum of 
$74,867.50. Full and complete satisfaction of the Award of Arbitrator has been received. 
DATED this / < day of December 2003. 
NUTTALL, BROWN & ASSOCIATES 
SCOTT D. BROWN 
Attorney for Claimant 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /cT"day of December, 2003. 
, sr-.rkZ"""""""Notary Public "I 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Byron Child Christiansen and 
Merrilee Christiansen, husband 
and wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
No. 20030836-SC 
030908140 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for Permission to 
Appeal an Interlocutory Order, filed pursuant to Rule 5 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Permission to Appeal 
an Interlocutory Order filed on October 17, 2003 is granted. 
For The Cour t : 
Date 
k/umlw /0 7M 7 
/ 
> ^ . 
Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
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In The Third Judicial District Court Of Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
BYRON CHILD CHRISTIANSEN 
MERRILEE CHRISTIANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF DECISION 
Judge: Joseph C Fratto, Jr 
Case No. 030908140 
RE: Plaintiffs Rule 37 Motion for Order Compelling Discovery; 
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Request to Stay breach of 
Contract, Bad Faith and Associated Causes; Defendant's Motion for Protective 
Order pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
See attached decision. 
Dated this 7 . day of / yC £AY~, 2003 
/ 
*. 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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BYRON CHILD CHRISTIANSEN MINUTE ENTRY 
MERRILEE CHRISTIANSEN Case No. 030908140 
Judge Fratto 
V. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
The matter is before the court to consider Plaintiffs' Rule 37 Motion for Order 
Compelling Discovery; Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Request to Stay Breach 
of Contract, Bad Faith and Associated Causes; defendant's Motion for Protective Order Pursuant 
to Rule 26(c). 
Plaintiffs' filed a complaint alleging three causes of action: breach of contract, breach of 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty. By stipulation, the 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty was dismissed on July 15, 2003. 
There is a written policy agreement providing for arbitration. The scope of arbitration 
is contractually limited to disputes relative to recovery for damages caused by an uninsured or 
under-insured motorist. 
The applicable statutory provision is 78-3la-108(7), which provides that: 
(7) If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding 
that involves a claim subject to the arbitration. If a claim subject to the arbitration is severable, 
the court may limit the stay to that claim. 
Plaintiffs' complaint incorporates in each cause of action similar allegations of fact and 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
theories of recovery. However, a distinction can be made between the causes. First Cause, Breach 
of Contract seeks damages resulting from the negligence of the uninsured motorist to which 
plaintiffs' claim they are contractually entitled from defendant. The breach is the failure of 
defendant to pay these damages. 
Second Cause, Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing prays relief 
for defendant's failure to act upon, investigate and process plaintiffs' claims in a timely manner. 
The first claim incorporates a dispute anticipated by the parties arbitration covenant. The second, 
though related in the pleadings, is a different claim of breach of contract, not subject to 
arbitration. 
Although the court is afforded discretion in the statute, severance of the claims in this 
case is appropriate. Plaintiffs' second cause cannot be arbitrated, and the results from the 
arbitration will not affect the judicial outcome of the second cause. 
Accordingly, arbitration of plaintiffs' First Cause of Action, Breach of Contract is 
ordered, and that claim is stayed during the pendency of the arbitration. Defendant's request to 
stay the claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is denied. That 
cause of action will proceed. 
Plaintiffs' seek an order compelling defendant to admit or deny a portion of those 
certain Request for Admissions and Request for Production of Documents. The court has a copy 
of the Request for Admissions, but does not have a request for production, and, consequently, 
can make no determination concerning them. 
Defendant responded to the request for admissions, as permitted by Rule 36(a)(1) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, by lodging objections to certain requests on various grounds. Rather 
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than compelling a response, the court is called upon to rule on the objections, and will do so. 
The objections to Request Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 are overruled. Counsel for plaintiffs 
shall provide to counsel for defendant a copy of the written statement referenced in Request No. 
7, and defendant shall admit or deny within five (5) day of receipt of the same. 
Defendant's objection, lack of foundation, to Request No. 10 is sustained. 
Defendant shall have ten (10) days from receipt of this minute entry to admit or deny the 
requests to which an objection was overruled. 
Defendant's motion seeking a protective order concerning plaintiffs request for 
production of documents cannot be addressed herein. As indicated above, the court does not have 
a copy of the request, and cannot determine whether defendant is entitled to the court's order 
protecting it from producing the material. 
Accordingly, the clerk will schedule a telephonic conference to discuss the motion, and 
defendanfwill provide a copy of the request directly to the clerk not less that two (2) days before 
the conference. 
This minute entry constitutes the order regarding the matters addressed herein. No further 
order is required. 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 03 0908140 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail SCOTT D. BROWN 
ATTORNEY PLA 
6925 UNION PARK CENTER 
SUITE 210 
MIDVALE, UT 84047 
Mail BARBARA L MAW 
ATTORNEY DEF 
185 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SUITE 340 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated this /__ day of 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
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CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 31A-22-305 
History. C. 1953, 31A-22-304, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1992, ch. 132, § 2; 
1993, ch. 271, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Liability of county. 
Liability of self-insurers. 
Step-down coverage. 
Cited. 
Liability of county. 
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own 
vehicles operated by permissive users, under 
former law. See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 712 
R2d 224 (Utah 1985). 
Liability of self-insurers. 
Public policy as expressed in Utah law is that 
self-insurers must provide security for damages 
inflicted by themselves, and by permissive us-
ers of their vehicles. There is no expressed 
public policy that would require finding Habil-
ity based upon mere ownership of a vehicle. 
Lane v. Honeywell, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 370 (D. 
Utah 1987) (decided under former Title 31). 
Step-down coverage. 
Section 31A-22-303 does not prohibit insur-
ers from providing step-down coverage for per-
missive users, as long as the coverage satisfies 
the statutory minimums set forth in this sec-
tion. Cullum v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 
922 (Utah 1993). 
Cited in Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786 
P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Consortium claim of spouse, parent 
or child of accident victim as within extended 
"per accident" rather than "per person" cover-
age of automobile liability policy, 46 A.L.R.4th 
735. 
What constitutes single accident or occur-
rence within Hability policy limiting insurer's 
liability to a specified amount per accident or 
occurrence, 64 A.L.R.4th 668. 
Validity and operation of "step-down" provi-
sion of automobile liability policy reducing cov-
erage for permissive users, 29 A.L.R.5th 469. 
31A-22-305. Uninsured and underinsured motorist cover-
age. 
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes: 
(a) the named insured; 
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, 
or guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household, 
including those who usually make their home in the same household but 
temporarily live elsewhere; 
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle: 
(i) referred to in the policy; or 
(ii) owned by a self-insurer; and 
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or 
operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily 
injury to or death of persons under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes: 
(a) (i) a motor vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is 
not covered under a hability policy at the time of an injury-causing 
occurrence; or 
(ii) (A) a motor vehicle covered with lower liability limits than 
required by Section 31A-22-304; and 
(B) the motor vehicle described in Subsection (2)(a)(ii)(A) is 
uninsured to the extent of the deficiency; 
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31A-22-305 INSURANCE CODE 
(b) an unidentified motor vehicle that left the scene of an accident 
proximately caused by the motor vehicle operator; 
(c) a motor vehicle covered by a liability policy, but coverage for an 
accident is disputed by the liability insurer for more than 60 days or 
continues to be disputed for more than 60 days; or 
(d) (i) an insured motor vehicle if, before or after the accident, the 
liability insurer of the motor vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of 
competent jurisdiction; and 
(ii) the motor vehicle described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is uninsured 
only to the extent that the claim against the insolvent insurer is not 
paid by a guaranty association or fund. 
(3) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(b) 
provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of 
bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death. 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of 
uninsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the 
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured 
motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's 
motor vehicle policy, unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser 
amount by signing an acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that:' 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of uninsured motorist cover-
age; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase unin-
sured motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of 
the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum unin-
sured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the 
insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(c) Self-insurers, including governmental entities, may elect to provide 
uninsured motorist coverage in an amount that is less than their maxi-
mum self-insured retention under Subsections (3)(b) and (4)(a) by issuing 
a declaratory memorandum or policy statement from the chief financial 
officer or chief risk officer that declares the: 
(i) self-insured entity's coverage level; and 
(ii) process for filing an uninsured motorist claim. 
(d) Uninsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are 
less than the minimum bodily injury limits for motor vehicle liability 
policies under Section 31A-22-304. 
(e) The acknowledgment under Subsection (3)(b) continues for that 
issuer of the uninsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, 
requests different uninsured motorist coverage from the insurer. 
(f) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after 
January 1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall 
disclose in the same medium as the premium renewal notice, an 
explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage and the 
costs associated with increasing the coverage in amounts up to and 
including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the 
insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry uninsured 
motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor 
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CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 31A-22-305 
vehicle liability policy limits or the maximum uninsured motorist 
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor 
vehicle policy. 
(a) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4Kb), the named insured may 
reject uninsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the 
insurer that provides liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-
302(l)(a). 
(ii) This rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that 
includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of uninsured motor-
ist coverage. 
(hi) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage 
until the insured in writing requests uninsured motorist coverage 
from that liability insurer. 
(b) (i) All persons, including governmental entities, that are engaged in 
the business of, or that accept payment for, transporting natural 
persons by motor vehicle, and all school districts that provide trans-
portation services for their students, shall provide coverage for all 
motor vehicles used for that purpose, by purchase of a policy of 
insurance or by self-insurance, uninsured motorist coverage of at least 
$25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. 
(ii) This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an 
injured covered person. 
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage: 
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, 
Workers' Compensation Act; 
(ii) may not be subrogated by the Workers' Compensation insur-
ance carrier; 
(hi) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' 
Compensation insurance; 
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the 
r. .covered person has been made whole; 
(v) may not be collected for bodily injury or death sustained by a 
person: 
(A) while committing a violation of Section 41-la-1314; 
(B) who, as a passenger in a vehicle, has knowledge that the 
vehicle is being operated in violation of Section 41-la-1314; or 
(C) while committing a felony; and 
(vi) notwithstanding Subsection (4)(c)(v), may be recovered: 
(A) for a person under 18 years of age who is injured within the 
scope of Subsection (4)(c)(v) but limited to medical and funeral 
expenses; or 
(B) by a law enforcement officer as defined in Section 53-13-
103, who is injured within the course and scope of the law 
enforcement officer's duties. 
(d) As used in this Subsection (4): 
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning as under Section 
63-30-2. 
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under Section 41-la-
102. 
When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor vehicle under 
Jction (2)(b) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered 
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31A-22-305 INSURANCE CODE 
person or the motor vehicle occupied by the covered person, the covered person 
must show the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and convinc-
ing evidence consisting of more than the covered person's testimony. 
(6) (a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage for two or more 
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to 
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person 
for any one accident. 
(b) (i) Subsection (6)(a) applies to all persons except a covered person 
as defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii). 
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii) is 
entitled to the highest limits of uninsured motorist coverage afforded 
for any one motor vehicle that the covered person is the named 
insured or an insured family member. 
(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the motor 
vehicle the covered person is occupying. 
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off 
against the other. 
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall 
be primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under 
Subsections (l)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage. 
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section apphes to bodily.^ 
injury, sickness, disease, or death of covered persons while occupying or 
using a motor vehicle only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy 
under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or 
replacement motor vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. Except as 
provided in Subsection (6) or this Subsection (7), a covered person injured 
in a motor vehicle described in a policy that includes uninsured motorist 
benefits may not elect to collect uninsured motorist coverage benefits from 
any other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a covered 
person. 
(b) Each of the following persons may also recover uninsured motorist 
benefits under any one other policy in which they are described as a 
"covered person" as defined in Subsection (1): 
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor 
vehicle; and 
(ii) except as provided in Subsection (7)(c), a covered person injured 
while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is not owned, leased, or 
furnished, to the covered person, to the covered person's spouse, or to 
the covered person's resident parent or resident sibling. 
(c) (i) A covered person may recover benefits from no more than two 
additional policies, one additional policy from each parent's household 
if the covered person is: 
(A) a dependent minor of parents who reside in separate 
households; and 
(B) injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is not 
owned, leased, or furnished to the covered person, the covered 
person's resident parent, or to the covered person's resident 
sibling. 
(ii) Each parent's policy under this Subsection (7)(c) is liable only 
for the percentage of the damages that the limit of liability of each 
parent's policy of uninsured motorist coverage bears to the total of all 
uninsured coverage applicable to the accident. 
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CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES > 31A-22-305 
(d) A covered person's recovery under any available policies may not 
exceed the full amount of damages. 
(e) A covered person in Subsection (7)(b) is not barred against making 
subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a 
motor vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered 
under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but 
which has insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the injured 
party for all special and general damages. 
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include: 
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the 
same policy that also contains the underinsured motorist coverage; 
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2); or 
(hi) a motor vehicle owned or leased by the named insured, the 
named insured's spouse, or any dependant of the named insured. 
(9) (a) (i) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-
302(l)(c) provides coverage for covered persons who are legally 
entitled to recover damages from owuers or operators of underinsured 
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death. 
(ii) A covered person occupying or using a motor vehicle owned, 
leased, or furnished to the covered person, the covered person's 
spouse, or covered person's resident relative may recover underin-
sured benefits only if the motor vehicle is: 
(A) described in the policy under which a claim is made; or 
(B) a newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle covered 
under the terms of the policy. 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of 
underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of 
the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underin-
sured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's 
motor vehicle policy, unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser 
amount by signing an acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist cov-
erage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase under-
insured motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits 
of the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum 
underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under 
the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(c) Self-insurers, including governmental entities, may elect to provide 
underinsured motorist coverage in an amount that is less than their 
maximum self-insured retention under Subsections (9)(b) and (9)(g) by 
issuing a declaratory memorandum or policy statement from the chief 
financial officer or chief risk officer that declares the: 
(i) self-insured entity's coverage level; and 
(ii) process for filing an underinsured motorist claim. 
(d) Underinsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are 
less than $10,000 for one person in any one accident and at least $20,000 
for two or more persons in any one accident. 
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(e) The acknowledgment under Subsection (9)(b) continues for that 
issuer of the underinsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, 
requests different underinsured motorist coverage from the insurer. 
(f) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as described 
in Subsection (9)(a), is secondary to the liability coverage of an owner or 
operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection (8). 
Underinsured motorist coverage may not be set off against the liability 
coverage of the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but 
shall be added to, combined with, or stacked upon the Uability coverage of 
the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle to determine the 
limit of coverage available to the injured person. 
(g) (i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by 
an express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage 
under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a). 
(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer 
that includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured 
motorist coverage and when it would be applicable. 
(hi) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage 
until the insured in writing requests underinsured motorist coverage 
from that liability insurer. 
(h) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after^ 
January 1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall 
disclose in the same medium as the premium renewal notice, an 
explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and the 
costs associated with increasing the coverage in amounts up to and 
including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the 
insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry underin-
sured motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's 
motor vehicle liability policy limits or the maximum underinsured 
motorist coverage limits available bjr the insurer under the insured's 
motor vehicle policy. 
(10) (a) (i) Except as provided in this Subsection (10), a covered person 
injured in a motor vehicle described in a policy that includes under-
insured motorist benefits may not elect to collect underinsured 
motorist coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance 
policy. 
(ii) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two 
or more motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or 
stacked to determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an 
injured person for any one accident. 
(iii) Subsection (10)(a)(ii) applies to all persons except a covered 
person as defined under Subsections (10)(b)(i) and (ii). 
(b) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (10)(b)(ii), a covered person 
injured while occupying, using, or maintaining a motor vehicle that is 
not owned, leased, or furnished to the covered person, the covered 
person's spouse, or the covered person's resident parent or resident 
sibling, may also recover benefits under any one other policy under 
which they are a covered person. 
(ii) (A) A covered person may recover benefits from no more than 
two additional policies, one additional policy from each parent's 
household if the covered person is: 
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(I) a dependent minor of parents who reside in separate 
households; and 
(II) injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that 
is not owned, leased, or furnished to the covered person, the 
covered person's resident parent, or the covered person's 
resident sibling. 
(B) Each parent's policy under this Subsection (10)(b)(ii) is 
liable only for the percentage of the damages that the limit of 
liability of each parent's policy of underinsured motorist coverage 
bears to the total of all underinsured coverage applicable to the 
accident. 
(iii) A covered person's recovery under any available policies may 
not exceed the full amount of damages. 
(iv) Underinsured coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time 
of an accident shall be primary coverage, and the coverage elected by 
a person described under Subsections (l)(a) and (b) shall be secondary 
coverage. 
(v) The primary and the secondary coverage may not be set off 
against the other. 
(vi) A covered person as defined under Subsection (10)(b)(i) is 
entitled to the highest limits of underinsured motorist coverage under 
only one additional policy per household applicable to that covered 
person as a named insured, spouse, or relative. 
(vii) A covered injured person is not barred against making subse-
quent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage: 
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, 
Workers' Compensation Act; 
(ii) may not be subrogated by the Workers' Compensation insur-
ance carrier; 
(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' 
•V * Compensation insurance; 
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the 
covered person has been made whole; 
(v) may not be collected for bodily injury or death sustained by a 
person: 
(A) while committing a violation of Section 41-la-1314; 
(B) who, as a passenger in a vehicle, has knowledge that the 
vehicle is being operated in violation of Section 41-la-1314; or 
(C) while committing a felony; and 
(vi) notwithstanding Subsection (10)(c)(v), may be recovered: 
(A) for a person under 18 years of age who is injured within the 
scope of Subsection (10)(c)(v) but limited to medical and funeral 
expenses; or 
(B) by a law enforcement officer as defined in Section 53-13-
103, who is injured within the course and scope of the law 
enforcement officer's duties. 
(11) The inception of the loss under Subsection 31A-21-313M) for underin-
ired motorist claims occurs upon the date of the last liability policy payment. 
(12) (a) Within five business days after notification in a manner specified by 
the department that all liability insurers have tendered their liability 
policy limits, the underinsured carrier shall either: 
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31A-22-305 INSURANCE CODE 
(i) waive any subrogation claim the underinsured carrier may have 
against the person liable for the injuries caused in the accident; or 
(ii) pay the insured an amount equal to the policy limits tendered 
by the liability carrier, 
(b) If neither option is exercised under Subsection (12)(a), the subroga-
tion claim is deemed to be waived by the underinsured carrier. 
(13) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a covered person may 
seek, subject to the terms and conditions of the policy, additional coverage 
under any policy: 
(a) that provides coverage for damages resulting from motor vehicle 
accidents; and 
(b) that is not required to conform to Section 31A-22-302. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-305, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 157; 
1987, ch. 162, § 1; 1992, ch. 1, § 4; 1992, ch. 
132, § 3; 1993, ch. 271, § 2; 1994, ch. 316, 
§ 15; 1995, ch. 294, § 1; 1996, ch. 240, § 12; 
1997, ch. 375, § 14; 1999, ch. 158, § 1; 2000, 
ch. 188, § 1; 2001, ch. 59, § 1; 2003, ch. 76, 
§ 2; 2003, ch. 218, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
ment, effective March 18, 1999, added Subsec-
tion (2)(c), redesignating former Subsection 
(2)(c) as (2)(d), and made related and stylistic 
changes in the section. 
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, 
added Subsections (3)(b) to (3)(e), (4)(a)(ii), 
(4)(c)(ii) to (4)(c)(iv), (9)(b) to (9)(d), (9)(f)(ii), 
(10)(c), and (11), and made related changes; 
deleted "For new policies or contracts written 
after January 1, 1993" from the beginning of 
Subsection (9)(f)(i); rewrote Subsection (9)(g), 
revising the provisions for notice and disclo-
sure; and made stylistic changes. 
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 
ANALYSIS 
Construction with other statutes. 
Exclusionary clause. 
Hit and run. 
"Legally entitled to recover." 
Cited. 
Construction with other statutes. 
The Workers' Compensation Act is not the 
exclusive remedy for injured employees who 
seek to recover from someone who is not their 
employer, or an officer, agent, or employee of 
the employer, and these employees do have 
viable claims against such third parties. Lieber 
v. ITT Hartford Ins. Ctr, Inc., 2000 UT 90, 15 
R3d 1030. 
The Workers' Compensation Act does not 
preclude injured employees from having alter-
native viable claims against an uninsured 
third-party tortfeasor, or against an uninsured 
2001, corrected a subsection reference in Sub-
section (10)(b)(ii) and added Subsection (12). 
The 2003 amendment by ch. 76, effective May 
5, 2003, substituted "motor vehicle" for "vehi-
cle" several times throughout the section; de-
leted "beginning with the effective date of this 
act" before "continues" in Subsection (2)(c); 
added Subsections (4)(c)(v), (7)(c) and (d), 
(8)(b)(iii), (9)(a)(ii), and (13); rewrote Subsec-
tions (7)(b), (10), and (11); and made related 
and stylistic changes. 
The 2003 amendment by ch. 218, effective 
May 5, 2003, inserted subdivision designations 
(i and (ii) in Subsection (l)(c); deleted "begin-
ning with the effective date of this act" before 
"continues" in Subsection (2)(c); added "and" at 
the end of Subsection (2)(d)(i); added Subsec-
tions (3)(c) and (9)(c); made appropriate 
changes in subsection designations; and made a 
spelling correction and stylistic changes. 
This section has been reconciled by the Office 
of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
motorist insurance carrier; therefore, the trial 
court erred when it interpreted Subsection 
(4)(h)(ii) of this section to preclude recovery of 
both workers' compensation and uninsured mo-
torist benefits in every case. Lieber v. ITT 
Hartford Ins. Ctr., Inc., 2000 UT 90, 15 P.3d 
1030. 
Exclusionary clause. 
An exclusionary clause to uninsured motorist 
coverage is permissible. Former § 41-12-21.1, 
which required insurers to offer uninsured mo-
torist coverage and authorized motorists to 
waive coverage, did not further require insur-
ers to allow an individual to purchase insur-
ance on one vehicle and obtain coverage on all 
the other vehicles in his household. Clark v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 1227 
(Utah 1987). 
Neither this section nor public policy forbids 
restrictions on uninsured motorist coverage 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 31A-22-305 
such as an exclusion from coverage of vehicles 
owned by the insured not included in the policy 
and for which no premiums are paid. Hind v. 
Quilles, 745 R2d 1239 (Utah 1987). 
A policy that covered the insured for any 
injury caused by an uninsured motorist, ex-
cluding therefrom only uninsured "automo-
biles *' owned by the insured, did not exclude 
uninsured motorist coverage when the insured 
was operating a motorcycle. Bear River Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Wright, 770 P.2d 1019 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Hit and run. 
Utah law does not require an actual collision 
to recover under the uninsured motorist stat-
ute. Marakis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 765 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobile 
Insurance § 35 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Time limitations as to claims based 
on uninsured motorist clause, 28 A.L.R.3d 580. 
Vahdity of exclusion in automobile insurance 
policy precluding recovery of no-fault benefits 
for injuries arising out of the ownership, main-
tenance, or use of an uninsured vehicle owned 
by an insured, 18 A.L.R.4th 632. 
Validity, construction, and effect of "consent 
to sue" clauses in uninsured motorist endorse-
ment of automobile insurance policy, 24 
AL.R.4th 1024. 
Combining or "stacking" uninsured motorist 
coverages provided in policies issued by differ-
ent insurers to different insureds, 28 A.L.R.4th 
362. 
Validity of exclusion of injuries sustained by 
insured while occupying "owned" vehicle not 
insured by policy, 30 A.L.R.4th 172. 
Vahdity, construction, and effect of statute 
establishing compensation for claims not paid 
because of insurer's insolvency, 30 A.L.R.4th 
1110. 
Uninsured motorist insurance: injuries to 
motorcyclist as within affirmative or exclusion-
ary terms of automobile insurance policy, 46 
A.L.R.4th 771. 
Punitive damages as within coverage of un-
insured or underinsured motorist insurance, 54 
A.L.R.4th 1186. 
Right of insured, precluded from recovering 
against owner or operator of uninsured motor 
vehicle because of governmental immunity, to 
recover uninsured motorist benefits, 55 
A.L.R.4th 806. 
What constitutes "entering" or "alighting 
from" vehicle within meaning of insurance pol-
icy, or statute mandating insurance coverage, 
59A.L.R.4thl49. 
P.2d 882 (Utah 1988) (decided under prior law). 
"Legally entitled to recover.* 
For an insured to satisfy the "legally entitled 
to recover" criterion, a viable claim that can be 
reduced to judgment is required. Peterson v. 
Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 192 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 934 R2d 652 (Utah 
1997). 
Cited in Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786 
P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); United States 
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 
1993); Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 2002 
UT App 221, 51 P.3d 1288, cert, denied, 59 P.3d 
603. 
Automobile uninsured motorist coverage: "le-
gally entitled to recover" clause as barring 
claim compensable under workers' compensa-
tion statute, 82 A.L.R.4th 1096. 
"Excess" or "umbrella" insurance policy as 
providing coverage for accidents with unin-
sured or underinsured motorists, 2 A.L.R.5th 
922. 
Insured's recovery of uninsured motorist's 
claim against insurer as affecting subsequent 
recovery against tortfeasors causing injury, 3 
A.L.R.5th 746. 
Uninsured and underinsured motorist cover-
age: enforceability of policy provision limiting 
appeals from arbitration, 23 A.L.R.5th 801. 
Uninsured or underinsured motorist insur-
ance: validity and construction of policy provi-
sion purporting to reduce recovery by amount 
of social security disability benefits or pay-
ments under similar disability benefits law, 24 
A.L.R.5th 766. 
Uninsured and underinsured motorist cover-
age: vahdity, construction, and effect of policy 
provision purporting to reduce coverage by 
amount paid or payable under workers' com-
pensation law, 31 A.L.R.5th 116. 
Right of employer or workers' compensation 
carrier to lien against, or reimbursement out of, 
uninsured or underinsured motorist proceeds 
payable to employee injured by third party, 33 
A.L.R.5th 587. 
Validity and construction of provision of un-
insured or underinsured motorist coverage that 
damages under the coverage will be reduced by 
amount of recovery from tortfeasor, 40 
A.L.R.5th 603. 
Requirement that multicoverage umbrella 
insurance policy offer uninsured or underin-
sured motorist coverage equal to liability limits 
under umbrella provisions, 52 A.L.R.5th 451. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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31A-22-305.5 INSURANCE CODE 
Validity of territorial restrictions on unin- Uninsured motorist indorsement: construc-
sured/underinsured coverage in automobile in- tion and application of requirement that there 
surance policies, 55 A.L.R.5th 747. be "physical contact" with unidentified or hit-
Validity, construction, and application of ex- and-run vehicle; "Huss-and-run'' cases, 77 
elusion of government vehicles from uninsured A.L.R.5th 319. 
motorist provision, 58 A.L.R.5th 511. Uninsured motorist indorsement: general is-
Automobile insurance: what constitutes "oc- sues regarding requirement that there be 
cupying" under owned-vehicle exclusion on un- "physical contact" with unidentified or hit-and-
insured- or underinsured-motorist coverage of run vehicle, 78 A.L.R.5th 341. 
automobile insurance policy, 59 A.L.R.5th 191. Uninsured motorist indorsement: construc-
Who is "member" or "resident" of same "fam- tion and application of requirement that there 
ily" or "household" within no-fault or uninsured be "physical contact" with unidentified or hit-
motorist provisions of motor vehicle insurance and-run vehicle; "hit-and-run" cases, 79 
policy, 66 A.L.R.5th 269. A.L.R.5th 289. 
31A-22-305.5. Property damage protection. 
(1) At the request of the named insured, every motor vehicle liability policy 
of insurance under Sections 31A-22-303 and 31A-22-304 or combination of 
policies purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security requirement of 
Section 41-12a-301 which policy does not provide insurance for collision 
damage shall provide coverage for property damage to the motor vehicle 
described in the policy for the benefit of covered persons, as defined under 
Section 31A-22-305, who are legally entitled to recover damages from the 
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, as defined under Subsections 
31A-22-305(2)(a), (c), and (d), arising out of the operation, maintenance, or use 
of an uninsured motor vehicle. 
(2) The coverage provided under this section shall include payment for loss 
or damage to the motor vehicle described in the policy, not to exceed the motor 
vehicle's actual cash value or $3,500, whichever is less. Property damage does 
not include compensation for loss of use of the motor vehicle. 
(3) The coverage provided under this section shall be payable only if: 
(a) the occurrence causing the property damage involves actual physi-
cal contact between the covered motor vehicle and an uninsured motor 
vehicle; 
(b) the owner, operator, or license plate number of the uninsured motor 
vehicle is identified; and 
(c) the insured or someone on his behalf reports the occurrence within 
ten days to the insurer or his agent. 
(4) The coverage provided under this section shall be subject to a $250 
deductible and shall be excess to any other insurance covering property 
damage to the motor vehicle described in the policy. 
(5) The insurer providing coverage under this section may make available 
additional deductibles at appropriate premium rates. 
(6) No rating surcharge may be applied to any policy of motor vehicle 
insurance issued in this state as a result of payment of a claim made under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-305.5, enacted "Subsections 31A-22-305(2)(a), (c), and (d)" for 
by L. 1990, ch. 321, § 1; 1999, ch. 158, § 2. "Subsections 31A-22-305(2)(a) and (c)" in Sub-
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- section (1). 
ment, effective March 18, 1999, substituted 
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